

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 184570
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY AF/E:GSCOTT:AB
APPROVED BY AF:RMOOSE
AF/E:RPOST
S/S-O : AWOTTO

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O P 060145Z AUG 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SANA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 184570

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SO, US, MASS

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN SOMALI AMBASSADOR ADDOU AND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, AUGUST 4, 1977
SECRET

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BEGIN SUMMARY: THE SOMALI AMBASSADOR REQUESTED URGENT ACTION
TO SUPPLY ARMS BEFORE ETHIOPIA ATTACKED SOMALIA. IF ARMS
COULD NOT BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY BEFORE THE END OF AUGUST,
THEN THE US SHOULD PERMIT THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS FROM
IRAN OR SAUDI ARABIA. OTHERWISE, SIAD WOULD BE FORCED
TO ABANDON HIS REORIENTATION AND CONTINUE HIS DEPENDENCE ON
THE SOVIETS. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE US
AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE ARTICLES STILL
STANDS, BUT ESCALATION IN THE OGADEN SUBSEQUENT TO THE AGREE-
MENT HAS CREATED DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

WE WILL BE REVIEWING THESE PROBLEMS WITH THE VISITING
SOMALI DELEGATION. END SUMMARY.

1. AMBASSADOR ADDOU HAD JUST RETURNED FROM MOGADISCIO
BRINGING A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT SIAD TO PRESIDENT CARTER
WHICH HE GAVE TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE FOR DELIVERY.
2. AMBASSADOR ADDOU OUTLINED THE SERIOUS SITUATION WHICH
EXISTS BETWEEN SOMALIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIETS
HAVE APPLIED GREAT PRESSURE TO GET SIAD TO MOSCOW TO MEET
WITH BREZHNEV AND PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO MEDIATE THE SOMALIA-
ETHIOPIA DISPUTE. SINCE THE RECENT VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT
SAMANTAR HAD RESULTED IN DEADLOCKED TALKS, SIAD PREFERRED TO
CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS AT A LOWER LEVEL AND THEREFORE SENT
MINISTER OF MINING KASSIM. IN MOSCOW KASSIM MET WITH
GROMYKO WHO DEFENDED THE ETHIOPIAN REGIME AND ACCUSED
SOMALIA OF BEING USED BY OUTSIDE FORCES TO DESTROY ETHIOPIAN
UNITY. GROMYKO INSISTED THAT SINCE SOMALIA HAD NOT PRESSED
HER TERRITORIAL CLAIMS WHILE HAILE SELASSIE WAS ALIVE, IT
WAS ALL THE MORE INAPPROPRIATE THAT SHE DO SO NOW AGAINST
A FELLOW SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT. KASSIM DENIED ANYTHING
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THE PACE OF SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ETHIOPIA. ADDOU
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THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THE LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC
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RETURN TO MOGADISCIO NEXT WEEKEND WITH SOMETHING CONCRETE.

4. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE BEGAN BY REITERATING PRESI-

DENT CARTER'S STRONG DESIRE TO SEE OUR RELATIONS IMPROVE, BUT THE CONSTRAINTS ON OUR ABILITY TO GO FORWARD WERE MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT BELIEVED. EVEN IF THE MONEY COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TODAY, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COULD NOT MOVE WITHIN THE TIME FRAME THE SOMALIS DESIRE. MR. MOOSE NOTED HE HAD HELPED DRAFT THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976 AND HAD NEVER REALIZED THEN THAT HE WOULD NOW FIND THE ACT SO CUMBERSOME, BUT IT HAD
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BEEN CAREFULLY DRAWN TO BE PROOF AGAINST PRECIPITATE ACTION BY THE ADMINISTRATION. IN ADDITION, THE CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINTS SUCH AS THE ARMS TRANSFER ACT AND PRESIDENT CARTER'S OWN ARMS TRANSFER POLICY HAVE BEEN WIDELY SUPPORTED AND NOW THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNDER POLITICAL AND POPULAR AS WELL AS LEGAL RESTRAINT. WE ARE FORCED TO JUSTIFY ANY ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN EXCEPTIONAL INSTRUMENT OF POLICY. PRESIDENT CARTER PARTICULARLY DOES NOT WISH ARMS TO BE A DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE NOR DOES HE WISH TO INTRODUCE NEW WEAPONS. ALL THESE CONDITIONS THEREFORE LIMIT OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND.

5. WE ARE AWARE OF PRESIDENT SIAD'S DESIRE FOR POLITICAL REORIENTATION AND WE HAVE RESPONDED TO THAT DESIRE. BUT CONDITIONS HAVE RECENTLY CHANGED. SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THE INSURGENCY IN THE OGADEN WAS A SMALL ONE, BUT NOW A FAR GREATER INSTABILITY THREATENS THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ETHIOPIA AND THESE CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE OUR JUSTIFICATION FOR ARMS TRANSFERS DIFFICULT. WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFRICAN STATES, AND WE DEFENDED THIS PRINCIPLE IN OUR ZAIRE POLICY. THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH OUR POLICY, A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED. WE CANNOT, FOR EXAMPLE, IGNORE THE APPEARANCE OF SOMALI SUPPORT FOR THE GROUPS FIGHTING IN THE OGADEN, AND OUR OWN INFORMATION INDICATES THAT REGULAR SOMALI UNITS ARE ENGAGED. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SEELYE STRESSED IN HIS LAST CONVERSATION WITH ADDOU THAT ANY ARMS WE SUPPLIED WOULD BE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE AND THAT WE WOULD NOT PROVIDE ARMS TO BE USED IN THE OGADEN. YET WE NOTE THAT THE LIST OF ITEMS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM SOMALIA INCLUDES MANY ITEMS THAT ARE NOT PROPERLY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. ARE THE ARMS SOMALIA SEEKS TO DEFEND AGAINST AN ETHIOPIAN COUNTER-ATTACK IN THE OGADEN? CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC WILL WANT TO KNOW.

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6. MR. MOOSE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT PROVIDING AN ELABORATE RATIONALE FOR DOING NOTHING, BUT WE DID NEED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOMALI TIME FRAME WAS NOT A REALISTIC ONE. THERE WAS NO BACKING AWAY FROM THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE ARMS. PRESIDENT CARTER IS

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8. MR. MOOSE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS A DISTINCT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR ATTITUDE AND THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION: WE WERE NOT ARMING THE ETHIOPIANS AND THEY WERE. HE WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE SOVIET'S PRESENCE IN AFRICA NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF OCCASIONAL THREATS TO OUR OWN INTERESTS, BUT BECAUSE WE HAVE NOTED THAT FREQUENTLY WHEN
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THEY GIVE ARMS, THE RECIPIENTS THEN MAKE TROUBLE FOR THEIR NEIGHBORS. WE HAD WANTED TO GET TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO OFFER SOMALIA AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF SUPPLY, AND WE HAD, IN FACT, ACTIVELY ENCOURAGED OTHER NATIONS IN THIS RESPECT. WE ALSO WANT TO SEE THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI SITUATION STABILIZE, AND WE THEREFORE SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE. WE DO NOT INTEND TO DISCOURAGE OTHER NATIONS FROM HELPING THE SOMALIS, NOR HAVE WE CHANGED OUR BASIC DECISION, BUT THAT DECISION WAS TO HELP SOMALIA DEFEND ITSELF WITHIN HER PRESENT BOUNDARIES, NOT TO DEFEND ENLARGED BOUNDARIES. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN COMMUNITY TOWARD AN ENLARGED SOMALIA; WAS SOMALIA PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORT? WE WELCOMED THE TEAM'S VISIT SO THAT WE COULD EXPLORE THESE VARIOUS PROBLEMS.

9. ADDOU REPLIED THAT IT WAS AT PRESIDENT SIAD'S SUGGESTION THAT A MEDIATION COMMITTEE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN 1974 BUT BECAUSE OF ETHIOPIAN OPPOSITION THE MEDIATION HAD NOT

SUCCEEDED. THE ETHIOPIANS ASKED FOR A SPECIAL MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE OAU BUT FAILED TO GET THE NECESSARY TWO-THIRDS CONCURRENCE. ACCORDINGLY, THEY HAVE TURNED TO THE OAU MEDIATION COMMITTEE. THE SOMALI FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ON HIS WAY TO LIBREVILLE AND THE SOMALIS ARE OPEN TO MEDIATION IF THE ATTITUDE FROM ETHIOPIA IS FAVORABLE TO A SOLUTION. THE SOMALI OFFICIAL POSITION IS THAT THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT IS NOT INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ETHIOPIANS AND THE WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION FRONT. HOWEVER, THE SOMALIS WOULD AGREE TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE LIBERATION FRONT IF A FAIR PROPOSAL WAS PUT FORWARD, BUT IF ADDIS ABABA INSISTED THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE WESTERN LIBERATION FRONT, THAT WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. .

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VALUABLE AND THAT WE MIGHT SAY SO IN PUBLIC.

10. ADDOU INSISTED THAT SOMALIA DID NOT ENCOURAGE THE LIBERATION FRONT TO TAKE ADDIS ABABA OR THREATEN ETHIOPIA AS PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD. EVEN PRESIDENT NYERERE HAD SAID IN 1963 THAT THE SOMALI-ETHIOPIAN BOUNDARY WAS DIFFERENT FROM THE BOUNDARIES OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN AFRICA. IF THE US DESIRED ASSURANCES THAT ITS ARMS BE USED ONLY TO DEFEND SOMALIA'S PRESENT TERRITORY, AND NOT USED IN ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA WOULD BE HAPPY TO OBLIGE. IN ANY CASE, ADDOU INSISTED, THE FIGHTING IN THE OGADEN WOULD END BEFORE THE MONTH WAS OUT. ONLY HARAR, DIRA DAWA AND JIJIGA REMAINED IN ETHIOPIAN HANDS. THEREFORE, THE ARMS THAT SOMALIA WAS ASKING FOR WOULD NOT BE USED IN THE OGADEN BUT TO DRIVE BACK THE ETHIOPIANS IF THE SOVIETS SUCCEEDED IN ENCOURAGING THEM TO ATTACK SOMALIA. "YOUR ARMS WILL NOT REACH THE OGADEN. THE FIGHTING WILL BE OVER THERE BEFORE THEY ARRIVE."

11. PRESIDENT SIAD WAS VERY WORRIED BY THE SITUATION, IN PART BECAUSE HE COULD EXPECT LITTLE UNDERSTANDING FROM THE SOVIETS IF HE WERE REQUIRED TO RETURN TO THEM. THEY DID NOT FORGIVE EASILY. VICE PRESIDENT SAMANTAR, WHO WAS CLOSEST TO THE SOVIETS, CONTINUES TO INSIST THAT WHATEVER THE UNITED STATES PROMISES, ITS ARMS WILL ARRIVE TOO LATE. SIAD, HOWEVER, BELIEVES THAT IF THE US WANTS TO, THE U.S. CAN GET ARMS TO SOMALIA IN TIME. COME WHAT MAY, SIAD COULD NOT STOP THE LIBERATION FRONT, EVEN IF HE WANTED TO.

12. ADDOU REPEATED HIS REQUEST THAT WE AT LEAST AUTHORIZE IRAN AND SAUDI ARABIA TO DELIVER ARMS; HE ALSO ASKED THAT AN APPOINTMENT BE ARRANGED WITH DR. BRZEZINSKI. MR. MOOSE AGREED TO LOOK INTO THE LATTER POSSIBILITY. HE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT WE WERE PROCEEDING ON OUR PLAN TO SEND A PL-480 EXPERT TO MOGADISCIO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AS WELL AS AN
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AGRICULTURAL DESIGN TEAM. CHRISTOPHER

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DRAFTED BY:EUR/EE:DNJOHNSON

APPROVED BY:EUR:MR LUERS

AF/E:JWHITING

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TO AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

S E C R E T STATE 184570

EXDIS

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 184570 ACTION MOGADISCIO INFO PARIS
LONDON CAIRO JIDDA KHARTOUM SANA TEHRAN ISLAMABAD BONN ROME
NAIROBI ADDIS ABABA MOSCOW USUN DATED AUG 06:

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S E C R E T STATE 184570

EXDIS

FOLLOWING TEL SENT ACTION MOGADISCIO INFO PARIS, LONDON CAIRO,
JIDDA, KHARTOUM, SANA, TEHRAN, ISLAMABAD, BONN, ROME, NAIROBI,
ADDIS ABABA, MOSCOW, USUN NEW YORK FROM STATE AUG 06:

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 184570

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SO, US, MASS

SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN SOMALI AMBASSADOR ADDOU AND
ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE, AUGUST 4, 1977

BEGIN SUMMARY: THE SOMALI AMBASSADOR REQUESTED URGENT ACTION
TO SUPPLY ARMS BEFORE ETHIOPIA ATTACKED SOMALIA. IF ARMS
COULD NOT BE DELIVERED DIRECTLY BEFORE THE END OF AUGUST,
THEN THE US SHOULD PERMIT THIRD COUNTRY TRANSFERS FROM
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IRAN OR SAUDI ARABIA. OTHERWISE, SIAD WOULD BE FORCED
TO ABANDON HIS REORIENTATION AND CONTINUE HIS DEPENDENCE ON
THE SOVIETS. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE US
AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE ARTICLES STILL
STANDS, BUT ESCALATION IN THE OGADEN SUBSEQUENT TO THE AGREE-

MENT HAS CREATED DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION.
WE WILL BE REVIEWING THESE PROBLEMS WITH THE VISITING
SOMALI DELEGATION. END SUMMARY.

1. AMBASSADOR ADDOU HAD JUST RETURNED FROM MOGADISCIO
BRINGING A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT SIAD TO PRESIDENT CARTER
WHICH HE GAVE TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE FOR DELIVERY.

2. AMBASSADOR ADDOU OUTLINED THE SERIOUS SITUATION WHICH
EXISTS BETWEEN SOMALIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE SOVIETS
HAVE APPLIED GREAT PRESSURE TO GET SIAD TO MOSCOW TO MEET
WITH BREZHNEV AND PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO MEDIATE THE SOMALIA-
ETHIOPIA DISPUTE. SINCE THE RECENT VISIT OF VICE PRESIDENT
SAMANTAR HAD RESULTED IN DEADLOCKED TALKS, SIAD PREFERRED TO
CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS AT A LOWER LEVEL AND THEREFORE SENT
MINISTER OF MINING KASSIM. IN MOSCOW KASSIM MET WITH
GROMYKO WHO DEFENDED THE ETHIOPIAN REGIME AND ACCUSED
SOMALIA OF BEING USED BY OUTSIDE FORCES TO DESTROY ETHIOPIAN
UNITY. GROMYKO INSISTED THAT SINCE SOMALIA HAD NOT PRESSED
HER TERRITORIAL CLAIMS WHILE HAILE SELASSIE WAS ALIVE, IT
WAS ALL THE MORE INAPPROPRIATE THAT SHE DO SO NOW AGAINST
A FELLOW SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT. KASSIM DENIED ANYTHING
MORE THAN SUPPORT FOR THE WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION FRONT
AND LEFT MOSCOW WITHOUT ACHIEVING ANY RESULTS. THE
SOMALIS INSIST THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD SPEAK TO THE MENGISTU
REGIME AND GET ETHIOPIA TO GRANT THE RIGHTS DEMANDED FOR
THE SOMALIS IN THE OGADEN BY THE LIBERATION FRONT. THE
SOMALIS CONSIDER THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO BE AN ULTIMATUM,
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IN FACT IF NOT IN WORDS; THIS CONCLUSION IS REINFORCED BY
THE PACE OF SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO ETHIOPIA. ADDOU
CLAIMED THAT THE SOMALIS BELIEVE THE ETHIOPIANS ARE
PLANNING TO ATTACK SOMALIA AND CUT IT IN TWO.

3. SIAD HAS MADE HIS DECISION TO PHASE OUT HIS SOVIET
CONNECTION, BUT NOW THE SOMALIS ARE ON THE SPOT. THE
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE US DECISION HAS INCREASED THE
DANGER OF A SOVIET REACTION AGAINST SOMALIA AND IT IS
ESSENTIAL THAT THE US SUPPLY SOME OF THE ARMS SOMALIA HAS
ASKED FOR BY THE END OF AUGUST. IF THE US DELAYS LONGER
IT MAY BE TOO LATE AND SIAD WILL HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT
TO RETURN TO THE SOVIETS AND MAKE WHAT AMENDS HE CAN FOR
HIS DEVIATION FROM THE SOCIALIST LINE. THE RESULT MAY WELL
BE A SOMALI REGIME AS SUBSERVIENT AS THAT OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT UNDERSTANDS THE LEGAL AND BUREAUCRATIC
REQUIREMENTS THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST MEET WHEN IT
TRANSFERS ARMS, BUT THE SOMALIS ASK AT LEAST THAT WE PERMIT
THE IRANIANS AND SAUDIS TO MEET THE IMMEDIATE NEED WHILE
WE COMPLETE OUR OWN FORMALITIES. EVENTS REQUIRE THAT ADDOU
RETURN TO MOGADISCIO NEXT WEEKEND WITH SOMETHING CONCRETE.

4. ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOOSE BEGAN BY REITERATING PRESIDENT CARTER'S STRONG DESIRE TO SEE OUR RELATIONS IMPROVE, BUT THE CONSTRAINTS ON OUR ABILITY TO GO FORWARD WERE MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT BELIEVED. EVEN IF THE MONEY COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TODAY, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT COULD NOT MOVE WITHIN THE TIME FRAME THE SOMALIS DESIRE. MR. MOOSE NOTED HE HAD HELPED DRAFT THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT OF 1976 AND HAD NEVER REALIZED THEN THAT HE WOULD NOW FIND THE ACT SO CUMBERSOME, BUT IT HAD BEEN CAREFULLY DRAWN TO BE PROOF AGAINST PRECIPITATE ACTION BY THE ADMINISTRATION. IN ADDITION, THE CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINTS SUCH AS THE ARMS TRANSFER ACT AND PRESIDENT CARTER'S OWN ARMS TRANSFER POLICY HAVE BEEN WIDELY SUPPORTED AND NOW THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNDER POLITICAL AND POPULAR AS
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WELL AS LEGAL RESTRAINT. WE ARE FORCED TO JUSTIFY ANY ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN EXCEPTIONAL INSTRUMENT OF POLICY. PRESIDENT CARTER PARTICULARLY DOES NOT WISH ARMS TO BE A DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE NOR DOES HE WISH TO INTRODUCE NEW WEAPONS. ALL THESE CONDITIONS THEREFORE LIMIT OUR ABILITY TO RESPOND.

5. WE ARE AWARE OF PRESIDENT SIAD'S DESIRE FOR POLITICAL REORIENTATION AND WE HAVE RESPONDED TO THAT DESIRE. BUT CONDITIONS HAVE RECENTLY CHANGED. SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THE INSURGENCY IN THE OGADEN WAS A SMALL ONE, BUT NOW A FAR GREATER INSTABILITY THREATENS THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ETHIOPIA AND THESE CIRCUMSTANCES MAKE OUR JUSTIFICATION FOR ARMS TRANSFERS DIFFICULT. WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF AFRICAN STATES, AND WE DEFENDED THIS PRINCIPLE IN OUR ZAIRE POLICY. THEREFORE, ALTHOUGH WE WOULD LIKE TO MOVE AHEAD WITH OUR POLICY, A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS HAVE BEEN RAISED. WE CANNOT, FOR EXAMPLE, IGNORE THE APPEARANCE OF SOMALI SUPPORT FOR THE GROUPS FIGHTING IN THE OGADEN, AND OUR OWN INFORMATION INDICATES THAT REGULAR SOMALI UNITS ARE ENGAGED. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SEELYE STRESSED IN HIS LAST CONVERSATION WITH ADDOU THAT ANY ARMS WE SUPPLIED WOULD BE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE AND THAT WE WOULD NOT PROVIDE ARMS TO BE USED IN THE OGADEN. YET WE NOTE THAT THE LIST OF ITEMS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM SOMALIA INCLUDES MANY ITEMS THAT ARE NOT PROPERLY DEFENSIVE IN NATURE. ARE THE ARMS SOMALIA SEEKS TO DEFEND AGAINST AN ETHIOPIAN COUNTER-ATTACK IN THE OGADEN? CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC WILL WANT TO KNOW.

6. MR. MOOSE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT PROVIDING AN ELABORATE RATIONALE FOR DOING NOTHING, BUT WE DID NEED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE SOMALI TIME FRAME WAS NOT A REALISTIC ONE. THERE WAS NO BACKING AWAY FROM THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION IN
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PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE ARMS. PRESIDENT CARTER IS NOT A MAN TO GO BACK ON HIS WORD, BUT WE DID NEED TO RE-ASSESS THE SITUATION AND ASK WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN THE SITUATION IN THE OGADEN STABILIZED? WHAT WOULD ETHIOPIA'S LONGER TERM REACTION BE?

7. IN REPLY AMBASSADOR ADDOU EMPHASIZED THAT THE SOMALIS WERE NOT CALLING THE PRESIDENT'S INTENTIONS INTO QUESTION. THEY HAD NOTED PRESIDENT CARTER'S PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT HE WISHED TO PROVIDE DEFENSIVE MEANS TO FRIENDS AND ALLIES; ADDOU WAS SURE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD BE PLEASED BY THE LETTER HE WAS ABOUT TO RECEIVE FROM PRESIDENT SIAD. ADDOU POINTED OUT THAT SIAD'S DECISION TO SEEK OUT THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES WAS MADE BECAUSE OF HIS TRUST IN PRESIDENT CARTER'S STATEMENTS AS WELL AS BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT WITH ETHIOPIA. PRESIDENT SIAD WAS ENCOURAGED TO MAKE HIS POLITICAL DECISION TO SEEK ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF SUPPORT IN THE FACE OF SOVIET PRESSURE BY PRESIDENT CARTER'S OWN EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. BUT IF THE SOVIETS AND THE UNITED STATES BOTH ADOPT THE SAME LINE, IF BOTH ATTEMPT TO SAVE THE MENGISTU REGIME, WHAT DIFFERENCE IS THERE FOR SIAD. THE WHOLE POLICY TOWARD THE REGION IS AT STAKE, NOT JUST THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION FRONT.

8. MR. MOOSE REPLIED THAT THERE WAS A DISTINCT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OUR ATTITUDE AND THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION: WE WERE NOT ARMING THE ETHIOPIANS AND THEY WERE. HE WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT WE ARE CONCERNED BY THE SOVIET'S PRESENCE IN AFRICA NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF OCCASIONAL THREATS TO OUR OWN INTERESTS, BUT BECAUSE WE HAVE NOTED THAT FREQUENTLY WHEN THEY GIVE ARMS, THE RECIPIENTS THEN MAKE TROUBLE FOR THEIR NEIGHBORS. WE HAD WANTED TO GET TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO OFFER SOMALIA AN ALTERNATIVE SOURCE OF SUPPLY, AND WE HAD, IN FACT, ACTIVELY ENCOURAGED OTHER NATIONS IN THIS RESPECT. WE ALSO WANT TO SEE THE ETHIOPIAN-SOMALI
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SITUATION STABILIZE, AND WE THEREFORE SUPPORT THE EFFORTS OF THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES TO RESOLVE THE DISPUTE. WE DO NOT INTEND TO DISCOURAGE OTHER NATIONS FROM HELPING THE SOMALIS, NOR HAVE WE CHANGED OUR BASIC DECISION, BUT THAT DECISION WAS TO HELP SOMALIA DEFEND ITSELF WITHIN HER PRESENT BOUNDARIES, NOT TO DEFEND ENLARGED BOUNDARIES. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR US TO KNOW, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ATTITUDE OF THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN COMMUNITY TOWARD AN ENLARGED SOMALIA; WAS SOMALIA PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH THE OAU MEDIATION EFFORT? WE WELCOMED THE TEAM'S VISIT SO THAT WE COULD EXPLORE THESE VARIOUS PROBLEMS.

9. ADDOU REPLIED THAT IT WAS AT PRESIDENT SIAD'S SUGGESTION

THAT A MEDIATION COMMITTEE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN 1974 BUT BECAUSE OF ETHIOPIAN OPPOSITION THE MEDIATION HAD NOT SUCCEEDED. THE ETHIOPIANS ASKED FOR A SPECIAL MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE OAU BUT FAILED TO GET THE NECESSARY TWO-THIRDS CONCURRENCE. ACCORDINGLY, THEY HAVE TURNED TO THE OAU MEDIATION COMMITTEE. THE SOMALI FOREIGN MINISTER WAS ON HIS WAY TO LIBREVILLE AND THE SOMALIS ARE OPEN TO MEDIATION IF THE ATTITUDE FROM ETHIOPIA IS FAVORABLE TO A SOLUTION. THE SOMALI OFFICIAL POSITION IS THAT THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT IS NOT INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING BETWEEN THE ETHIOPIANS AND THE WESTERN SOMALI LIBERATION FRONT. HOWEVER, THE SOMALIS WOULD AGREE TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE LIBERATION FRONT IF A FAIR PROPOSAL WAS PUT FORWARD, BUT IF ADDIS ABABA INSISTED THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION WAS THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE WESTERN LIBERATION FRONT, THAT WILL NOT BE ACCEPTABLE. . MR. MOOSE REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE OAU EFFORTS WERE

VALUABLE AND THAT WE MIGHT SAY SO IN PUBLIC.

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